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ore than nearly any other phenomenon, globalization has had a pro-
found effect on the Mexican economy. Mexican labor markets have been 
particularly  affected.  Globalization  integrates  labor  markets  through 
trade, capital flows, and migration. Recent studies that mainly focus on Mexico’s 
manufacturing sector suggest that North American economic integration (particu-
larly Mexico’s integration with the United States since the North American Free 
Trade Agreement) has had potentially positive implications for Mexican workers. 
Rising trade has coincided with rising Mexican wages (relative to U.S. wages) and 
falling wage inequality within Mexico.
In terms of North American integration, the perceived competition between 
Mexican and U.S. workers may not be as accurate as popularly believed. Recent 
research suggests that Mexican and U.S. workers are complements rather than 
substitutes. Growing economic integration suggests that North America could and 
probably should be thought of as a unified market in terms of production.
As is increasingly understood, however, the net gains from integration may 
overshadow important losses for many workers. These losses explain persistent 
popular opposition to NAFTA and economic integration. The gains have been 
slow to arrive in many of Mexico’s rural areas, affecting political support for 
candidates (López Córdoba 2006). Rising U.S. border enforcement also may hide 
NAFTA’s benefits because the wages of Mexican workers decline when enforce-
ment increases. Further, while integration may bring technology, increased de-
mand, and trade, it also increases Mexican susceptibility to U.S. economic fluc-
tuations. Mexican manufacturing employment closely followed the drop in U.S. 
manufacturing employment during the 2001 U.S. recession.
Three main policy recommendations emerge from these studies. First, Mexico 62	 Raymond	Robertson
would continue to benefit, on net, from increased economic integration. Second, 
to the extent possible, Mexico should work to reduce migration restrictions into 
the United States. Third, the Mexican government should continue to direct ad-
justment assistance to rural and less economically active areas. Recent research 
has shown that workers in these areas are especially susceptible to shocks and 
that workers in more economically dynamic regions suffer much less from adjust-
ment and job loss. 
North American Economic Integration
Despite their differences in development status, the U.S. and Mexican econo-
mies are closely integrated. Robertson, Kumar, and Dutkowsky (2006) analyze 
matched product-level prices and find strong cointegrating relationships in these 
narrowly defined goods markets. Factor markets are also closely integrated. Rob-
ertson (2000) demonstrated that Mexican and U.S. labor markets are closely inte-
grated because wage shocks in the United States affect Mexican wages. Consis-
tent with economic integration, these effects are strongest along Mexico’s border 
region.
One goal of NAFTA was to deepen existing integration by fostering trade and 
capital flows. How successful it has been at these goals has been the subject of 
much debate. NAFTA studies are complicated by the December 1994 peso crisis. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a distinct change in both the level and trend of 
imports, exports, and capital flows after NAFTA went into force on January 1, 
1994. 
Figures 1A and 1B are from Robertson (2005a). Figure 1A shows that Mexico’s 
share of U.S. goods exports (the fraction of all U.S. goods exports that go to Mexi-
co) rises relatively steadily until the peso crisis. The sharp devaluation of the peso 
increased the Mexican price of U.S. exports, and, as a result, U.S. goods exports 
to Mexico fell sharply. The fall did not last long, however. During the recovery, 
the U.S. share of Mexican exports resumed its rise. The estimated rate of growth, 
however, was statistically higher in the post-NAFTA period than before NAFTA.
Figure 1B presents the results for Mexico’s share of U.S. imports (the fraction 
of all U.S. imports that come from Mexico). Like exports in Figure 1A, the Mexican 
share of U.S. imports rises prior to NAFTA. The peso crisis significantly affected 
this trend. The December 1994 crisis made Mexican exports cheaper for U.S. con-
sumers, and imports rose. During the recovery period, however, there was a clear 
increase in the level of Mexico’s share of U.S. imports. Furthermore, the rate of 
increase of this share was higher after NAFTA than before NAFTA.
Another goal of NAFTA was to increase capital flows. Figure 2 illustrates the 
total change in capital flows into Mexico during the 1980–2005 period. The level Globalization	and	Mexican	Labor	Markets	 63
Figure 1A
Mexico’s Share of U.S. Goods Exports
SOURCE: Robertson (2005a).
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and trend of flows into Mexico are higher after January 1, 1994. Several other 
reforms, such as capital account liberalization starting in 1989, facilitated these 
flows. The point is not that NAFTA per se explains this increase, only that flows 
into Mexico are higher in the NAFTA period.
Another measure of capital flows is maquiladora investment. The key feature 
of maquiladoras in this paper is their close relationship with U.S. manufacturing. 
By definition, maquilas are designed to be closely related to U.S. manufacturing. 
Figure 3 illustrates this relationship. The growth in maquiladora value added and 
U.S. manufacturing output follow very closely together. 
Labor Market Implications of Integration in Mexico
Absolute Wage Convergence
Revenga and Montenegro (1998) match industry-level data between Mexico 
and the United States and find that trade liberalization in Mexico lowered Mexi-
can wages relative to their industrial U.S. counterparts between 1984 and 1990. 
Hanson (2004) analyzes the Mexican population census in 1990 and 2000 and 
finds little, if any, evidence of wage convergence between the United States and 
Mexico. These results are not consistent with rising trade and foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) contributing to rising wages in Mexico. Although the labor mar-
Figure 2
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SOURCE: Banco de México, Series SE37 (“pasivos Inversión extranjera Directa”).Globalization	and	Mexican	Labor	Markets	 65
kets can be considered integrated, a substantial wage gap between Mexican and 
U.S. wages persists. To formally illustrate the gap and convergence, Robertson 
(2005b) matches the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU) and the similar U.S. Current Population 
Surveys (CPS). These data allow Robertson to control for individual-specific char-
acteristics and to track the time path of relative wages. 
Following Robertson (2000), the Mexican wages are converted to dollars us-
ing the nominal peso–dollar exchange rate. Then, to approximate a panel effect, 
Robertson (2005b) implements Deaton’s (1985) pseudo panel approach. This ap-
proach generates wage averages for different groups in the population and tracks 
the wages of these groups over time. Workers in each city fall into one of forty 
groups defined by five education levels and eight age groupings.1 The quarterly 
data run from 1987 to 2002.  Average wages of each cell in Mexico and the U.S. 
are matched to generate relative wage measures that control for changes in de-
mographic patterns. 
Figure 4, from Robertson (2005b), illustrates the evolution of the average 
wage gap for similarly defined age–education groups in the United States and 
Mexico (that is, comparing twenty-five- to thirty-year-old workers with twelve 
years of education). Contrary to the findings of Revenga and Montenegro (1998), 
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evident, but as Mexican wages begin to recover, the trend continues toward clos-
ing the gap. Figure 4 also illustrates Hanson’s result of a lack of convergence. The 
1999 level is very close to, if not slightly below, the 1989 level.
One of Robertson’s (2005b) main findings is that the rate of convergence is 
not significantly (if at all) faster during the NAFTA period than before the NAFTA 
period. Given the rise in the trend and level of trade and foreign direct invest-
ment, this result is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation is that trade 
and FDI do not have a significant effect on the U.S.–Mexican wage gap. Another 
possible explanation is that there is a third factor affecting wages in ways that 
mitigate the otherwise positive effects of trade and FDI.
Robertson (2005b) presents evidence supporting the latter. Using border en-
forcement hours, he finds that U.S. border enforcement depresses Mexican wages. 
These results are consistent with Mishra (2006), which finds that emigration has 
large positive effects on Mexican wages. Furthermore, this effect is comparable to 
the estimated positive effect of trade. This result is illustrated in Figure 5, which 
graphs the U.S.–Mexican wage ratio and U.S. border enforcement in Tijuana. The 
two series exhibit a strong inverse relationship, suggesting that U.S. border en-
forcement depresses Mexican wages or raises U.S. wages. Since Hanson, Spilim-
Figure 4
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NOTE: These series represent citywide averages of Mexican–U.S. wages for matched age-education groupings 
using the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) and the 
U.S. Current Population Surveys. The ratios are based on indexed real wages, converted to real values using 
domestic national consumer price indicators.
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bergo, and Robertson (2002) find that changes in U.S. border enforcement do not 
affect U.S. wages, the more plausible explanation seems to be that U.S. border 
enforcement depresses Mexican wages.
Relative Wages
The effect of globalization on relative wages in developing countries has 
been a topic of much debate. In particular, Mexico was one of the first countries 
to have a documented rise in wage inequality following trade liberalization. Since 
then, several other papers have shown that a similar phenomenon occurred in 
other developing countries (see Wood 1997 and the excellent survey by Goldberg 
and Pavcnik 2007). 
The literature contains several possible explanations for rising wage inequal-
ity, including, but not limited to, changes in industry-specific wage premiums 
(Revenga 1997; Cragg and Epelbaum 1996; Feliciano 2001), FDI (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1997), changes in tariffs that favored skilled workers (Hanson and Har-
rison 1999), changes in exchange rates that induced quality upgrading (Verhoo-
gen 2007), skill-biased technological change (Cañonero and Werner 2002), and 
changes in relative output prices (Robertson 2004). These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, and all could have played a role in rising wage inequality after 
Figure 5
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NOTE: Enforcement is measured in line-watch hours. The wage ratio is the citywide average of the indexed 
wage ratio of matched age–education groups using Mexican Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano and U.S. 
Current Population Survey data.
SOURCE: Robertson (2005b).68	 Raymond	Robertson
Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.
After NAFTA, however, wage inequality falls (Airola and Juhn 2001; Robert-
son 2004; López-Acevedo 2006). The fall emerges in consumption surveys, house-
hold surveys, the Mexican Industrial Census, and the Monthly Industrial Survey 
(Encuesta Industrial Mensual, or EIM).
These papers illustrate that wage inequality falls through 2001, but the trend 
continues through 2005.  To illustrate the recent evolution in the wage inequality 
trend, we draw from EIM. For the 1994–2005 period, aggregated data for 205 in-
dustries are available on the Internet.2 The survey is designed to cover 80 percent 
of Mexican manufacturing production and is based on the Mexican Industrial 
Census, which is taken every five years. For the period in this paper, the survey 
covers about 6,000 establishments.3 The survey excludes firms in the maquiladora 
industry, basic petrochemicals, petroleum refining, and firms with fifteen or fewer 
employees (microindustria). Variables include employment, hours, and wages 
for production (obreros) and nonproduction (empleados) workers, as well as the 
value of production and sales. Figure 6 shows the change in the employment-
weighted, within-industry ratio of average nonproduction to production worker 
wages. The relative wage of skilled workers continued rising during the crisis, 
consistent with Verhoogen (2007). Once the recovery began, however, the rela-
tive wage of skilled workers (as a measure of inequality) started to fall.
While the extent of technological change in Mexico may be debatable, Caño-
nero and Werner (2002) argue that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is 
relevant for Mexico in the GATT period. Haskel and Slaughter (1998) argue that 
it is the sector bias of SBTC, rather than simply SBTC itself, that explains changes 
in relative wages.4 To evaluate the degree of sector bias of SBTC, I use Mexican 
Industrial Census data and the methodological approach described by Haskel and 
Slaughter for industries indexed by k:
(1)       ∆Sk=a0+a1∆log(ws/wu)k+a2∆(K/Y)k+εk,
in which ∆Sk is the change in the nonproduction employment share in the total 
wage bill, wi (i = s,u) represents the wage of each worker type, K is capital, Y 
is real value-added output, and the final term is the error. Haskel and Slaughter 
suggest that SBTC in sector k can be represented by positive values of a0+εk. The 
estimates are positive, suggesting that all industries in all periods experienced 
SBTC (consistent with Cañonero and Werner). To evaluate the sector bias, Haskel 
and Slaughter assume that technology does not affect prices and regress their 
estimates of SBTC on the initial value of the nonproduction–production employ-
ment ratio.
The results, shown in Figure 7, suggest that the relationship between skill 
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1989 and 1994, and strongly positive from 1994 to 1999. The implication is that 
the sector bias of SBTC is in the opposite direction than would be expected if 
sector bias mattered and SBTC explained the changes in wage inequality.
Other explanations have similar difficulty accounting for the rise and fall of 
wage inequality. Trade, foreign investment, and exchange rates all follow either 
the same pattern before and after NAFTA, or move in ways following NAFTA that 
are inconsistent with the fall in relative wages.  
The only identified variable to move consistently with theory is relative pric-
es, suggesting that Stolper–Samuelson forces play a potentially significant role 
in explaining wage inequality in Mexico. The fall in the relative wages of skilled 
workers is consistent with neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher–Ohlin), which, 
under very restrictive assumptions, predicts that liberalization between a labor-
abundant and a skill-abundant country will induce an increase in the relative 
wages of less-skilled workers in the skill-scarce country. 
Even so, the literature has been slow to accept the Stolper–Samuelson expla-
nation for several reasons. First, price data are generally difficult to find. Very few 
papers use relative prices. Two notable exceptions are Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara 
(1999) and Gonzaga, Filho, and Terra (2006). Beyer et al. find a strong link be-
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NOTE: Series is the industry-employment-weighted average relative hourly wage of nonproduction workers 
(empleados) to production workers (obreros) in the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey. The series represents 
the  three-month  moving  average  of  the  relative  wage.  The  survey  excludes  maquiladora  employment  and 
otherwise represents all of Mexican manufacturing.
SOURCE: Encuesta Industrial Mensual.70	 Raymond	Robertson
Figure 7
Skill-Biased Technological Change Using Census Data
NOTE: Shapes represent industries, with the size representing industry employment.
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, Mexican Industrial Census 1985, 1989, 
1994.

















tween changes in relative prices and wage inequality in Chile, and Gonzaga et 
al. find a link between changes in relative wages and wage inequality in Brazil. 
Second, the literature tends to find few examples of significant between-industry 
shifts. The intuition behind the theorem suggests, although does not strictly re-
quire, that trade liberalization in a labor-abundant country will induce a shift to-
ward less-skill-intensive industries. As resources move toward less-skill-intensive 
industries, the demand for unskilled workers increases, raising the relative wage 
of skilled workers. 
Robertson (2004) shows that about 42 percent of the increase in demand for 
skill over the 1987–94 period is explained by between-industry shifts, and about 
32 percent of the fall in demand for skill over the 1994–98 period was due to 
between-industry shifts.5 One possible reason that the between-industry shifts 
are less than half of the total change (leaving more than half to be explained by 
within-industry shifts) is the shift toward the maquiladora sector. Figure 8 shows 
the rise in the ratio of maquila employment to the rest of Mexican manufacturing 
(using an index for both series). The data clearly show that maquiladora employ-
ment has been rising faster than employment in nonmaquila manufacturing.
This move would be consistent with an increasing demand for skill if maqui-
Figure 8















































NOTE:  The  maquiladora  employment  series  represents  total  maquiladora  employment  as  measured  by 
Mexico’s national statistics institute, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). The 
nonmaquila employment series is total employment in the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey (EIM). Both series 
are normalized to 1 in 1994. The line in this graph is the ratio of the two indexed series.
SOURCES: INEGI; EIM.72	 Raymond	Robertson
ladoras were, on average, more skill intensive. Table 1, however, suggests that 
maquiladoras have a much lower nonproduction–production worker wage ratio 
than the same industries in the Mexican Industrial Census. The relative produc-
tion-worker intensity of the maquiladora sector seems to suggest that its rela-
tive rise is consistent with a within-industry shift toward less-skilled production, 
which would be consistent with the change in relative prices in the NAFTA era.
Are Mexican and U.S. Workers Substitutes or Complements?
Several studies have suggested that immigrants to the United States are sub-
stitutes for generally less-educated U.S. workers and complements with higher-
skilled U.S. natives (Grossman 1982; Orrenius and Zavodny 2003; Ottaviano and 
Peri 2005). The rise of trade and mobility of capital suggests that Mexicans may 
be either substitutes for or complements with U.S. workers while they are still in 
Mexico. 
The question of whether U.S. and Mexican workers are substitutes or comple-
ments has been, implicitly, at the core of a great deal of political debate. One 
of the major fears of Mexican integration with the United States was that firms 
would flock to Mexico in search of low wages. It is certainly true that over the 
past 25 years, U.S. manufacturing employment has been falling. Figure 9 shows 
the evolution of U.S. manufacturing employment from 1979 to 2005. The graph 
shows that employment falls steeply during recessions and tends not to recover, 
leading to the cumulative decline. The most recent decline (since 2000) has been 
especially  dramatic,  renewing  concern  over  the  loss  of  relatively  well-paying 
manufacturing jobs.
If Mexican workers are substitutes, clearly there is cause for concern with 
past and future integration. Neoclassical trade theory, in particular, suggests that 
workers in the two countries would be substitutes in the sense that U.S. workers 
would be at risk of losing their jobs to Mexico. On the other hand, there are good 
reasons to believe that U.S. and Mexican workers would be complements. Feen-
stra and Hanson (1997), in particular, show how less-skilled workers in the U.S. 
would be substitutes for skilled workers in Mexico. Robertson (2006) formally 
tests this hypothesis.
Robertson matches Mexico’s EIM with U.S. Current Employment Statistics 
surveys. EIM was described earlier; the U.S. Current Employment Statistics pro-
gram covers about 300,000 employer units (over 35 percent of total payroll em-
ployment). The survey is conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics with 
cooperation from individual states. The data include average hourly wages and 
employment for production workers but do not include value of production or 
earnings of nonproduction workers. As a result, monthly production value is not Globalization	and	Mexican	Labor	Markets	 73
Table 1
Maquiladora Employment in 1998
	 	 	 	 	 	 																									N/P	employment	ratio
	 	 	 	 Employment	share
State	 	 	 	 		maquila/census	 	 						Census													Maquila
Aguascalientes  0.286  0.261  0.041
Baja California Norte  0.868  0.153  0.078
Baja California Sur  0.226  0.319  0.031
Campeche  0.000  0.357    –
Chiapas  0.000  0.311    –
Chihuahua  0.742  0.152  0.084
Coahuila  0.485  0.217  0.056
Colima  0.000  0.423    –
Distrito Federal  0.004  0.506  0.108
Durango  0.340  0.170  0.052
Guanajuato  0.048  0.192  0.051
Guerrero  0.060  0.282  0.022
Hidalgo  0.008  0.186  0.069
Jalisco  0.087  0.323  0.126
México State  0.020  0.352  0.121
Michoacán  0.000  0.308    –
Morelos  0.023  0.348  0.092
Nayarit  0.000  0.316    –
Nuevo León  0.142  0.285  0.090
Oaxaca  0.000  0.311    –
Puebla  0.101  0.198  0.047
Querétaro  0.552  0.422  0.083
Quintana Roo  0.000  0.299    –
San Luis Potosí  0.073  0.308  0.027
Sinaloa  0.022  0.401  0.148
Sonora  0.644  0.212  0.065
Tabasco  0.000  0.390    –
Tamaulipas  0.769  0.239  0.086
Tlaxcala  0.103  0.243  0.068
Veracruz  0.000  0.310    –
Yucatán  0.227  0.266  0.055
Zacatecas  0.154  0.326  0.070
Average  0.242  0.293  0.073
NOTES: Maquilas include services as well as manufacturing. In 1998, and over the 1990–2003 period, services 
averaged 4 percent of total maquila employment. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática does 
not report data for all states. We presume this reflects an insignificant number of maquiladoras and, therefore, 
enter zero for these states. The employment ratio is the nonproduction/production worker ratio.
SOURCE: INEGI Industrial Census.74	 Raymond	Robertson
available at the industry level.6 Hours and earnings data are available for about 
850 industries.
The Mexican and U.S. data are matched industry by industry at the most 
detailed level possible. Eighty industries were successfully matched. The level of 
aggregation ranges from three- to six-digit NAICS codes, with forty-one industries 
matched at the four-digit level and thirty-one matched at the five-digit level.
Robertson applies a labor-demand approach to estimate whether Mexican 
and U.S. production workers are complements or substitutes. This paper evalu-
ates the hypothesis before and after the NAFTA period. The main results indicate 
that during the NAFTA period, U.S. and Mexican production workers are comple-
ments, while U.S. production and Mexican nonproduction workers are substi-
tutes. This has significant implications for North American labor market integra-
tion. The United States and Mexico seem to act more like a single production unit 
rather than competing units. One may conclude from this result that while some 
job displacement is inevitable as economies adjust, North American economic 
interests are closely tied and policymakers would do well to think of Mexico as 
an economic partner rather than a competitor.
Figure 9























NOTE: The series represents total employment in manufacturing, seasonally adjusted.
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Some Economic Concerns
U.S. Economic Outlook
The  finding  that  U.S.  and  Mexican  production  workers  are  complements 
brings good and bad news (in the normative sense). First, the degree of inte-
gration with the U.S. ties Mexico’s fate to U.S. manufacturing. To some extent, 
this may help Mexico as competition from China increases. However, the recent 
decline in U.S. manufacturing employment can be closely linked to the decline 
in Mexican nonmaquila manufacturing employment. U.S. manufacturing employ-
ment has been falling for twenty-five years, and few economists predict the de-
cline to reverse over the medium run.
Furthermore, the United States is facing several potentially serious economic 
challenges. Since 1980, the U.S. trade deficit has been rising, and as Figure 10 
shows, the growth in U.S. federal debt is closely related to the U.S. trade deficit. 
The United States now has ratios of debt to gross domestic product greater than 
those of Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, all countries that have experi-
enced debt-related crises. 
Several prominent macroeconomists have suggested that a correction in the 
U.S. trade deficit, which they consider inevitable, could come in the next five to 
ten years. Several scenarios apply. The United States could experience a gradual 
Figure 10
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SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division; U.S. Department of the Treasury. 76	 Raymond	Robertson
depreciation of the dollar and, therefore, a gradual fall in consumer imports. To 
the extent that Mexico is integrated into the U.S. production chain, however, this 
depreciation could potentially help Mexico by increasing the demand for U.S. 
finished-good exports. If so, this could increase demand for Mexican exports to 
the United States, which would be helpful during a time of otherwise falling U.S. 
imports. The more integrated Mexico is in the U.S. production chain, the more 
positive (or less negative) will be the effects of a gradual or sudden depreciation 
of the dollar. 
The Chinese Threat
Hanson and Robertson (2006) apply a technique based on the gravity model 
of trade (as described in Hanson and Robertson 2005) to decompose Mexico’s 
export growth into components associated with export-supply capacity, import-
demand conditions, and other factors. Three main findings emerge. First, since 
the mid-1990s, Mexico’s export-supply capacities have improved relative to the 
rest of the world. Second, Mexico is relatively exposed to export-supply shocks 
from China. Industries in which Mexico has strong export capabilities are also 
those in which China’s capabilities are strong, and in most industries, China’s 
capabilities improve over time relative to Mexico’s. Had China’s export-supply 
capacities remained constant from 1994 onward, Mexico’s annual export growth 
rate would have been up to 1.5 percentage points higher during the late 1990s 
and up to 3 percentage points higher during the early 2000s. Third, while changes 
in Mexico’s export-supply capacities have contributed positively to the country’s 
export growth, changes in U.S. import demand in Mexico’s key export industries 
have not. Mexico’s exports are concentrated in sectors in which the United States 
has shown relatively weak growth in trade. Had U.S. GDP grown at the same rate 
from 2000 to 2004 as it did in the late 1990s, Mexico’s annual export growth rate 
would have been up to 1.4 percentage points higher.
Hanson and Robertson describe several important caveats to their results. The 
framework and analysis are confined to manufacturing industries. This approach 
may not capture the effects of U.S. and China business cycles on Mexico’s com-
modity trade. The counterfactual decompositions of export growth that we report 
do not account for general equilibrium effects. There could be feedback from a 
slowdown in China’s export growth or an increase in U.S. GDP growth that would 
cause us to overstate the growth consequences of such shocks for Mexico. Also, 
Hanson and Robertson do not explicitly account for zero trade between some 
countries.
The results hold important lessons for policymakers. Mexico’s ability to im-
prove its export-supply capacities (through modernization of its infrastructure, 
education system, energy sector, and so forth) compares favorably when one 
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of Mexico to export competition from China, however, the country’s improving 
export-supply capacities may come as small consolation. Mexico is vulnerable to 
export-supply shocks in China and, given slowly changing patterns of industrial 
specialization, is likely to remain so for the medium run. During the early 2000s, 
China’s impact on Mexico was roughly twice that of the U.S. economic slowdown. 
If the U.S. economy continues to expand, there is scope for Mexico to recover 
some of the export growth it enjoyed in the 1990s.
The regression results suggest that for Mexico to continue to expand its 
export-supply capacity in the country’s key export industries, it would need to 
expand the supply of labor, increase electricity production, reduce borrowing 
costs, and/or expand telecommunications infrastructure. Among the sample of 
countries that also export goods in Mexico’s primary export industries, growth in 
these factors is positively correlated with increases in export-supply capacity.
Conclusion
The question of integration remains especially salient for Mexico. Engage-
ment with the global economy even has political implications. For Mexico, en-
gagement in the global economy means integration with the United States. The 
contraction of the U.S. economy has traditionally hurt the Mexican economy, and 
integration brings risks. These risks, however, must be weighted against alterna-
tive policies (less integration, in this case) that seem less promising than deepen-
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